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Topics in Cyber Conflict
• Hacktivism
– Cyber attacks by non-state actors for political and social reasons
– Includes patriotic hacking, social hacking, and electronic jihad
• Cyberterrorism
– Cyber attacks for political and social reasons that cause severe 
harm and generate fear
• Cyber warfare (cyberwar)
– Cyber attacks by nation-state against nation-states
• User authentication
– One form of cyber defense
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Hacktivism - Findings
• Began over 20 years ago
• Tied to conflicts and issues beyond 
cyberspace
– Kosovo, Kashmir, Mideast, GWOT, 
Chechnya, Estonia, Georgia, spy plane
• Supported by websites and forums
– Offer hacking tools, instructions, 
targets, attack coordination
• Disruptive but not destructive





W O R M S    A G A I N S T    N U C L E A R    K I L L E R S
_______________________________________________________________
\__  ____________  _____    ________    ____  ____   __  _____/
\ \ \ /\ / /    / /\ \ | \ \ | |    | | / /    /
\ \ \ /  \ / /    / /__\ \ | |\ \ | |    | |/ /    /
\ \ \/ /\ \/ /    / ______ \ | | \ \| |    | |\ \ /
\_\ /__\ /____/ /______\ \____| |__\ | |____| |_\ \_/
\___________________________________________________/
\ /
\ Your System Has Been Officically WANKed    /
\_____________________________________________/
You talk of times of peace for all, and then prepare for war.
October 1989, just before launch of shuttle carrying Galileo probe.
Booster system was fueled with radioactive plutonium.
Took weeks to eradicate and cost NASA $500,000.
W O R M S    A G A I N S T    N U C L E A R    K I L L E R S
_______________________________________________________________
\__  ____________  _____    ________    ____  ____   __ _____/
\ \ \ /\ / /    / /\ \ | \ \ | |    | | / /    /
\ \ \ /  \ / /    / /_ \ \ | |\ \ | |   | |/ /    
\ \  /\ \/ /    / ______ \ | | \ \| |    |\ \
\_\ /__\ /____/ _____\ \____| |__\ | |____| |_\ \_/
\___________________________________________________/
\ /
\ Your System Has Been Officically WANKed    
\_____________________________________________/
You talk of times of peace for all, and then prepare for war.
October 1989, just before launch of shuttle carrying Galileo probe.
Booster system was fueled with radioactive plutonium.
Spread on NASA‟s SPAN network
Took weeks to eradicate and cost NASA $500,000.
5nmimc1.med.navy.mil
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7Spy Plane Incident (April 1, 2001)
• Organized, sustained cyber attacks, 
mainly 4/28/01-5/8/01
– Over 1,400 defacements from 140 
separate hacker handles
• Pro-Chinese hackers
– Honker Union of China, China 
Eagle group, Green Army Corps
– Internet postings and IRC to plan, 
coordinate assault
– Defacements, e-mail floods, DDoS 
attacks against White House, CIA
• Pro-US hackers 
– Pr0phet, Hackweiser, World of Hell
8GWOT Hacktivism - Oct 17, 2001 defacement of
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
Announced Al Qaeda Alliance Online
Gforce Pakistan, Pakistan Hackerz Club, Anti-India Crew
9http://www.zone-h.org/en/defacements/mirror/id=2917409
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M. As-Salim, 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad, 2003
Principle 34 (Electronic Jihad) on media operations and cyber attacks
Hacking “… is truly deserving of the term „electronic Jihad‟ since the 
term carries the meaning of force; to strike and to attack. So whoever 
is given knowledge in this field, then he should not be stingy with it in 
regards to using it to serve the Jihad. He should concentrate his efforts 
on destroying any American websites, as well as any sites that are 
anti-Jihad and Mujahidin, Jewish websites, modernist and secular 
websites.”
Anwar al Awlaki, 44 Ways of Supporting Jihad, 2009 (in English)
Principle 29 (WWW Jihad) covers media operations but not cyber attacks
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Danish Cartoon Attacks
• Response to publication of cartoons 
satirizing Prophet Mohammad in Danish 
paper Jyllands-Posten
• Web defacements [Zone-h.org]
– 2,817 Danish websites [1/21/06 - 2/22/06]
– Roberto Preatoni, Zone-h, said that it was 
about 10-20 times more than normal and “the 
biggest, most intense assault” he‟d seen
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
– Jyllands-Posten website primary target
– 3asfh.com released video purportedly 
documenting their attack
• Video and still shots at 
http://haganah.org.il/harchives/005456.html
– Republishers also hit, including Michelle 
Malkin‟s blog
• Coordinated through al-Ghorabaa website
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Electronic Jihad DoS Tool
• Version 2.0 features
– Gets targets from al-jinan site
– Handles different Internet speeds
– Proxies override website blocking
– Awards to attackers










Forum Users Improve Electronic Jihad Technology, Terrorism Focus, Vol IV, Issue 20, June 26, 2007, 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373496 .
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Talk Big – But
• Massive DoS attack to disable 13 root name servers
– Posting on jihadi forum discusses possibility, but got no response
– Claims it “would help destroy all of the west” and cause fall of global economy
– Source – Terrorism Research Center, Jun 26, 2006
• Disabling all electronic networks around the world
– To include military nets that control radars, missiles, and communications
– Claims that disabling for a day will bring about total collapse of the West and 
breakdown of world economy and stock markets
– Source – Alshech, Cyberspace as a Combat Zone, MEMRI, Feb 27, 2007
• Suggestions for electronic war
– Disable and paralyze battlefield C2 networks, GPS, GPRS, GSM
– Disrupt enemy banks, oil control grids, navigation techniques
– Target enemy‟s data flowcharts to paralyze life in country – but “do not ask me 
what flow charts are”
– Disable American missile attack or redirect missiles to launch site
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UK Trio
• Convicted of using Internet to incite terror murder
– Waseem Mughal
– Younes Tsouli (Irhabi007/Terrorist007)
– Tariq al-Daour
• Used stolen credit card info obtained via phishing and Trojan horses
– Charged over $3.5 million against cards at online stores
– Laundered money through gambling sites
• Accounts set up with stolen credit card numbers
• Winnings withdrawn and transferred to own accounts
• Set up jihadi Web forums and sites
– At least 72 cards used to register over 180 web sites at 95 hosting  firms
– Used FTP site of Arkansas Highway and Transportation Dept., GWU
– Posted 20p “Seminar on Hacking Websites”
• David McGuire, Washington Post, 7/13/04; Brian Krebs, Terrorism‟s 
Hook Into Your Inbox, Washington Post, 7/5/07
Hacktivism - Questions
• How will hacktivism evolve?
– Will some hacktivists become cyber terrorists?
• Should states be responsible for their hackers?
– Can states control their hackers?
– Are patriotic hackers encouraged or supported by their states?
• How should states respond to hacktivism?
– Defense only? Prosecution? Attack back?
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Cyberterrorism - Findings
• It hasn‟t happened
• Hacktivists/jihadists not currently 
interested or capable
• Jihadists sometimes talk big
– But lack capability to deliver
• But … critical infrastructures are 
vulnerable and have suffered 
damaging attacks
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Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructures
• Hackers caused 28 power outages in Wisconsin affecting 
30,000 customers [1999]
– Joseph Konopka & members of “Realm of Chaos”; damages of $800,000 
in NE Wisconsin [„Dr. Chaos‟ Goes to Prison for Hacking, CNN, 12/1/05]
• Former insider attacked Australian sewage system [1999]
– Caused raw sewage overflows ($13K damages; $100K monitor)
• 24-year-old man caused $11.4 million run on Columbia‟s 
Davivienda Bank [1999]
– Sent e-mails to private individuals and employees urging 
withdrawal of funds in light of pending government intervention
• 14-year-old built infrared device to control Polish tram 
system [2008]
– Derailed 4 trams and caused emergency stops and injuries
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CI Vulnerabilities Revealed
• Worms (Code Red, Slammer, etc.) have disrupted numerous systems
– Banking & ATMs, 911 systems, airline booking, train signaling, nuclear power 
plant monitoring
• Botnet hit computers at Northwest Hospital & Medical Center, 2005
– Operating room doors didn‟t open, computers in intensive care shut down, 
and doctors‟ pagers failed
• Spies penetrated US power grid and left malware behind, 2009
– From China, Russia, elsewhere [Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in US 
Penetrated by Spies, WSJ, 4/8/09]
• Staged cyber attack shows vulnerability in power grid, 2007
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• Will some hacktivists become cyberterrorists?
• Will some terrorists become cyberterrorists?
– Will they develop the capability or outsource it?
• How can we assess the threat?
– What are the indicators of a forthcoming capability or 
attack?
• Do we need special defenses?
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Cyber Warfare – Findings
• Over 100 nations are developing capability
– Fewer with advanced capabilities
• Attacks positively attributed to states have been narrowly focused to 
achieve specific results
– Israel conducted cyber attack against Syrian air defenses to assist air strike 
against Syrian target in Sept. 2007
• Attribution has been a major challenge
– Attacks by patriotic hackers are frequently attributed to states, but without 
presenting compelling evidence
• There are no explicit norms for cyber warfare
– Applying norms of armed conflict is doable, but hard
• Numerous unresolved policy issues
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Cyber Warfare – Questions
• Role of cyberspace in warfare
– What will be or should be its role? What are its limits?
– What attacks and targets are lawful and ethical?
– Are treaties needed to declare norms and constrain attacks?
• Effects of cyber attacks
– How do you determine or anticipate effects, including collateral damage?
– When will it constitute an act of war?
• Attribution and response
– How can you know who attacked you?
– How should you respond to an attack? Go public? Attack back?
– How can you anticipate how others will respond to your attacks?
• Cyber deterrence
– Is it workable or even relevant?
– Should deterrence policy be explicit? 22
Deter-Disarm-Defend
23
Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, RAND, 2009.
Cyber Defense: 
User Authentication – Findings
• Methods for user authentication
– Cyberspace: secrets (passwords/PINs, backup questions)
– Physical world: biometrics, things, social
• Password rules don‟t scale for users
– So users don‟t follow the rules
• Password rules don‟t address all major threats
– Phishing
– Malware (Trojans, keyloggers, etc)
– Circumvention





Biometrics & Digital Signatures
• Both can be used for authentication
• Both use publicly available information to authenticate
• Both assume that only the correct person can produce the 
authenticator
– Digital Signatures use secrets (private keys)
• Assumption fails if private key is stolen, cracked, or shared
• Security requires protecting secrets and changing compromised 
secrets
– Biometrics use biology (personal characteristics)
• Assumption fails if person can be mimicked
• Security requires discrimination and liveness
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Social Authentication – Vouching
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J. Brainard, A. Juels, R. L. Rivest, M. Szydlo, M. Yung, 
Fourth-Factor Authentication: Someone You Know, CCS’06.
Social Authentication
Possible Scenario for Social Network Site
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System: Enter your username: Alice
System invites 3 people in Alice’s network to authenticate her
2 people respond
Bob: Who is your youngest niece? Nancy
Bob accepts response
Carol: When did you visit me in New York? October 2005
Carol accepts response
System allows login
Authentication with Secrets About Your Network
Possible Scenario for Social Network Site
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System: Enter your username: Alice
System: Name someone in your network: Bob
System: Who is his youngest daughter? Nancy
System: Name someone else in your network: Carol
System: Where does Carol live? New York
System allows login
Cyber Defense: 
User Authentication – Questions
• Could we move away from secrets to biometrics?
• Can we make better use of things as authenticators?
• Can social networks play an effective role in authentication 
(and other areas of security)?
• Which authentication methods scale best for users (if every 
site used this …)?
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pdf‟s at http://faculty.nps.edu/dedennin/ .
